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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
---------- 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Plaintiffs, a class of Allegheny County judgment debtors, 
filed suit against Pennsylvania constables and the Court 
Administrator of Pennsylvania, alleging that plaintiffs were 
deprived of their property without due process of law by 
operation of Pennsylvania's rules governing the post-judgment 
levy and execution against property in proceedings before 
district justices.  Following a bench trial, the district court 
entered judgment for the defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Prior to the commencement of this action, each of the named 
plaintiffs was embroiled in a separate landlord-tenant proceeding 
before a district justice in Allegheny County.  As a result of 
these proceedings, they were evicted from their homes, had money 
judgments entered against them, and had their personal property 
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levied upon in satisfaction of that judgment.  Their individual 
stories are as follows. 
A. Barbara Cinea 
 Barbara Cinea, a welfare recipient who lived with her eight-
year-old son in Pittsburgh, fell behind on her rent payments when 
her welfare benefits were temporarily suspended.  In a proceeding 
before a district justice, Cinea's landlord, Robert Cox, obtained 
a judgment against her for rent due and for possession of the 
property she occupied.   
 On March 3, 1992, in accordance with that judgment, Cinea 
was served with an eviction notice.  Although the eviction was 
not to take effect until March 5, Cinea and her son fled 
hurriedly on March 4 in response to threats by the landlord, 
leaving behind all of their belongings.  The following day, a 
constable posted a notice on the door stating that the locks had 
been changed and instructing Cinea to make arrangements with her 
landlord within thirty days of the date of the notice in order to 
retrieve her possessions. 
 On March 16, 1992, before the thirty-day period had expired, 
Constable Daniel Certo, a defendant in this action, entered the 
house and levied on Cinea's property pursuant to a writ of 
execution issued by a district justice.  The levy, which was 
intended to satisfy the money judgment in the landlord-tenant 
action, covered "ANY AND ALL PROPERTY BELONGING TO DEFENDANT AT 
ADDRESS."  Although Constable Certo could have taken the levied 
property into his physical possession, he left it, as is 
customary, in Cinea's former residence subject to the terms of 
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the levy.  He then served Cinea at her mother's house with notice 
of the levy and execution.  The Notice of Levy stated: "YOU WILL 
THEREFORE NOT REMOVE THIS PROPERTY FROM THE PREMISES WITHOUT AN 
ORDER FROM ME." 
 Because certain pieces of the furniture that was levied upon 
belonged to Cinea's mother, her mother filed a property claim to 
recover them.  Following a hearing, a district justice ordered 
the release of Cinea's mother's property on March 19.  Pursuant 
to Pennsylvania rules for levy and execution proceedings, the 
landlord filed a timely objection in the state court of common 
pleas.  Meanwhile, for reasons that are unclear from the record, 
Cinea's mother did not receive her property.  The court scheduled 
the hearing on the landlord's appeal for September 15, 1992--
nearly six months after the district justice's order in Cinea's 
mother's favor. 
 Cinea herself also filed an objection to the levy, arguing 
that the value of the property seized far exceeded the amount of 
the underlying money judgment ($795) and that the levy was 
improper in that it included personal, unsalable items.  What 
happened next is not clear from the record.  It appears, however, 
that Cinea prevailed at least in part, and that the district 
justice ordered the release of much of the property that had been 
subject to the levy.  Letter Order of District Justice Connery 
(March 30, 1992).0  Ultimately, after filing the instant action, 
                                                           
0Cinea testified before the district court that the district 
justice "didn't do anything" with respect to Cinea's objection, 
and that Cinea appealed.  Tr. 126.  Cinea argues on appeal, 
however, that the district justice ruled in her favor.  
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Cinea settled with her landlord and recovered all of her 
property.  The landlord released Cinea's mother's property upon 
settlement as well. 
B. Sandra and Ken Bernardi 
 Sandra and Ken Bernardi were evicted from their apartment in 
January of 1992.  Before they had actually moved out, Constable 
Fred Taiber, a defendant in this action, levied upon certain of 
their property in satisfaction of a $606 money judgment entered 
against them in the eviction action.  The Notice of Levy, like 
the one given to Cinea, ordered the Bernardis not to remove any 
levied property from the premises without permission of the 
constable.  Constable Taiber told the Bernardis that they would 
be imprisoned if they violated this order. 
 Although the Bernardis' daughter succeeded in recovering 
property belonging to her that had been levied upon in 
satisfaction of her parents' debt, the Bernardis themselves filed 
no objection to the levy.  They moved out pursuant to their 
eviction, leaving the levied property behind.  The property was 
subsequently sold by the constable. 
C. Judith Wimbs 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Appellants' Brief, p.8.  The district court's Findings of Fact 
does not clarify this point, because it states merely that the 
district justice held a hearing on Cinea's claim and one on her 
mother's claim, and subsequently ordered the release of "some of 
the property."  App. 36.  Our review of the district justice's 
property release order was similarly unavailing; that document 
simply releases "all" property except certain enumerated items, 
without indicating whether the property released belonged to 
Cinea or to her mother. 
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 On November 21, 1991, a district justice entered an order of 
eviction and a $1,107 money judgment against Judith Wimbs.  She 
subsequently moved to a new address, where Constable Certo levied 
upon enumerated items of her personal property in satisfaction of 
the money judgment, and "any and all personal property of the 
defendant at the address."  Like the other plaintiffs in this 
action, Wimbs was served with a Notice of Levy that forbade her 
from removing any levied property without an order from the 
constable; however, unlike the Bernardis and Cinea, she retained 
possession of the property up until the time of sale. 
 Wimbs neither objected to the levy nor attempted to contact 
her landlord regarding satisfaction of the judgment. 
Consequently, the levied property was sold to the landlord.0 
II. 
 Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and all 
persons living in Allegheny County whose property has been or 
will be subject to levy and execution before the district 
justices of Allegheny County, alleging that the levy and 
execution procedures set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure Governing Actions and Proceedings Before District 
Justices (hereinafter "District Justice Rules") are 
unconstitutional.0  The bases of their claims are that the levy 
procedures deprive judgment debtors of the use of their property 
                                                           
0The final plaintiff in this matter, Betty Bendel, did not join 
in the appeal and thus is not discussed in this opinion. 
0Plaintiffs also asserted state-law claims for wrongful 
conversion and abuse of process against the constables, but they 
do not challenge the district court's disposition of these claims 
on appeal. 
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prior to sale in violation of the due process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and work an unlawful seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Plaintiffs prayed for 
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory and 
punitive damages.   
 Plaintiffs initially named six individual defendants: 
Pennsylvania State Constables Daniel Certo, Fred Taiber, and 
Patrick Siegworth; Bernard Regan, Manager of Constable Services 
of Allegheny County; Robert Cox, plaintiff Cinea's former 
landlord; and Nancy Sobolovitch, Court Administrator of 
Pennsylvania.  Upon plaintiffs' motion, however, defendants Cox 
and Siegworth were dismissed from the case prior to trial.    
 The case was tried without a jury on February 21 and 22, 
1995.  The district court entered a directed verdict in favor of 
defendant Regan, from which order plaintiffs do not appeal.  On 
February 24, the district court entered judgment in favor of all 
remaining defendants.  
 On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the district court's 
rulings on the constitutional claims.0  They raise the following 
three issues for our review: (1) whether judgment debtors whose 
property is held outside their possession pending appeal of a 
district justice's ruling are afforded a constitutionally 
adequate post-deprivation remedy; (2) whether the deprivations of 
                                                           
0Defendants Certo and Taiber did not enter appearances with 
respect to this appeal, apparently having settled.  Thus, the 
State Court Administrator, who is generally responsible for "the 
prompt and proper disposition of the business of all courts and 
justices of the peace," Penn. Const. art. IV, § 10(a), remains 
the sole appellee. 
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property that the plaintiffs suffered during the levy appeals 
process resulted from the levies or from their evictions; and (3) 
whether the levies at issue violated the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unlawful seizures insofar as the official levy 
form lent apparent authority to the landlords' unlawful retention 
of the property of their evicted tenants.  Because we believe the 
second issue is a subpart of the first, we will address issues 
(1) and (2) together.   
III. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1343.  As this is an appeal from a final order of a district 
court, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1291. 
IV. 
 We review the district court's findings of fact under a 
clearly erroneous standard and its findings of law de novo. 
Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
V. 
 We turn first to the question of whether plaintiffs were 
afforded a post-deprivation remedy adequate to satisfy the due 
process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
 "The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)(citation 
omitted). However, "'"[d]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
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time, place and circumstances.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  On the 
contrary, it is "'flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.'"  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Under the circumstances presented here, we must 
determine whether the procedures set forth in the District 
Justice Rules "represent[] a fair accommodation of the respective 
interests of creditor and debtor."  Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 
50, 58 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 It is axiomatic that the degree of procedural protection 
required by the Due Process Clause is proportional to the extent 
of the deprivation.  In this case, the extent of the deprivation 
is in dispute.  Plaintiffs argue that they were deprived of their 
property during the period between levy and execution by the 
Notice of Levy and the actions of the constables who served those 
notices, because the Notice and actions indicated to plaintiffs 
that removal of their property from the site of levying would 
expose them to the risk of criminal sanctions.  Defendants 
counter that the levies deprived plaintiffs only of the right to 
alienate their property, and that it was the evictions rather 
than the levies that deprived plaintiffs of the possession and 
use of their property.   
 It may well be the case that plaintiffs, through some 
combination of the Notice of Levy forms and the statements of the 
constables, were under the impression that they could not remove 
their property from the quarters from which they had been 
evicted.  However, neither the text of the forms nor the 
underlying law supports that assumption.   
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 The Notice of Levy forms served on plaintiffs warned them 
that they would face criminal penalties if they moved their 
levied property without the permission of the levying constable. 
The forms did not absolutely forbid plaintiffs to remove the 
property from their landlords' premises, and no plaintiff makes 
such an allegation.  Nor is there any evidence that any plaintiff 
sought the constable's permission to move her levied possessions 
and was refused.0  Judith Wimbs, the Bernardis, and Betty Bendel 
apparently did not make any attempt to move their property. Cinea 
testified that she asked Constable Certo to release her property 
to her at one point, but that he told her that her former 
landlord was the one with control over her possessions and that 
she would have to take it up with him.  Cinea does not dispute 
the truth of this assertion, nor could she do so; her former 
landlord had changed the locks on the building, and the constable 
had neither the authority to enter without the landlord's 
permission nor a means of entering without the landlord's key. 
   Moreover, under Pennsylvania law, a judgment debtor is 
subject to criminal sanctions only if she   
destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers or 
otherwise deals with property subject to a security 
interest or after levy has been made thereon with 
intent to hinder enforcement of such interest. 
 
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4110 (emphasis added).  A judgment debtor who 
retains possession of levied property may move her property post-
                                                           
0We question the relevance of evidence of the constables' 
behavior to the issue of whether the forms and procedures violate 
the due process clause, and our discussion of such evidence by no 
means reflects a determination that it is relevant. 
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levy as long as she does not do so with intent to conceal her 
movements or defeat execution and informs the constable of her 
new location.  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 14 Pa. D. & C. 603 (1930). 
 Plaintiffs argue that the fact that it may take three to 
four months for the court of common pleas to hear an appeal from 
a district justice's decision regarding the propriety of a levy 
constitutes a violation of due process.  We disagree.  First, 
while a constable theoretically has the legal right to take 
control and possession of levied property, the constable in each 
of these cases left the levied property on the premises.  Thus, 
if not for the eviction, each plaintiff would have retained the 
use and possession of her property pending appeal from the levy. 
Although a levy still works a deprivation of property even if the 
judgment debtor retains possession, Montgomery v. Green, 1989 WL 
121868, *4 (E.D. Pa. 1989)(not reported in F.Supp.), the fact 
that the judgment debtors retain possession and use of their 
property renders the deprivation slight and reduces the amount of 
process due. 
 Of course, a constable has the right to remove the levied 
property from the possession of the judgment debtor at the time 
of the imposition of the levy.  As none of the named plaintiffs 
suffered this type of deprivation, however, they do not have 
standing to challenge the rules on this ground.  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)(holding that 
to meet the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a 
plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that she has personally 
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suffered an "'injury in fact'" that will be redressed by a 
favorable decision).   
 Under the circumstances of this case, there is no question 
that the procedures provided satisfy the requirement of the due 
process clause.  The existing rules provide fairly extensive 
post-levy procedural protections for judgment debtors.  The 
levying constable must serve on the judgment debtor a notice 
which explains the nature of the levy and informs the debtor of 
her rights and liabilities.  R.409.  This notice informs the 
debtor that certain types of property are exempt from levy0 and 
that she is entitled to a $300 exemption, and explains the 
procedures for claiming the exemption, appealing from the levy, 
and obtaining free legal assistance if necessary.  Id.  If the 
debtor fails to claim the monetary exemption, the executing 
officer must set aside sufficient property to constitute a $300 
exemption in kind or, if in-kind division is not possible, $300 
in proceeds from the sale.  R.408. 
 The executing officer must give notice of the sale by 
mailing handbills to the judgment debtor and to the plaintiff at 
                                                           
0The notice states as follows:  
Your real estate cannot be taken on this execution, nor 
can perishable personal property or personal property 
which is intangible such as your bank accounts.  There 
are some other types of property which are exempt from 
execution under State and Federal law, such as wearing 
apparel, bibles, school books, sewing machines, 
military uniforms and equipment, most wages and 
unemployment compensation, social security benefits, 
certain retirement funds and accounts, certain veteran 
and armed forces benefits, certain insurance proceeds 
and such other exemptions as may be provided by law.  
R.409(2). 
13 
their last known addresses.  In addition, the executing officer 
must post handbills in the office of the district justice who 
issued the order of execution, at the place of levy, and at the 
place of sale, at least six days prior to the sale.  R.412. 
 The District Justice Rules provide for two ways of 
challenging the levy prior to sale of the goods.  First, the 
judgment debtor can file an objection in the office of the 
district justice on the ground that the levy is "illegal or 
excessive compared to the amount of the judgment, interest, and 
probable costs."  R.413(1).  Second, a third party with an 
interest in all or part of the property levied can file a claim. 
R.413(2).  The filing of such an objection stays the sale of the 
property pending a hearing pursuant to Rule 420.  R.413.   
 A district justice must hold a hearing on such an objection 
not later than five days after it is filed, after notifying all 
parties "by telephone or other timely means of communication." 
R.421.  The justice must then rule on the objection not later 
than three days after the hearing.  Id.  In making such ruling, 
the district justice may, among other things, 
(1) Reappraise or redesignate property appraised or 
designated by the executing officer, or order inclusion 
in the levy of property set aside by that officer; 
 
(2) Stay or order the abandonment of the levy in whole 
or in part, or release property from the levy; 
 
(3) Stay or prohibit a sale of all or part of the 
property levied upon; 
 
R.420(B).  Any stay of the execution proceedings ordered by the 
district justice is effective immediately.  R.421(D).  Other 
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orders do not take effect for ten days, so as to allow an 
aggrieved party in interest to appeal.  Id.  
 To appeal from a Rule 420 ruling of a district justice, the 
aggrieved party must file a statement of objection with the 
district justice within ten days of the order or determination. 
R.1016.  Unless and until the court of common pleas orders 
otherwise, the filing of an objection operates as a stay on any 
execution proceedings.  R.1020.  The court of common pleas 
reviews the district justice's determination de novo.  R.1019B.   
 In reviewing these procedural protections, the question we 
must ask is whether they "represent[] a fair accommodation of the 
respective interests of creditor and debtor."  Finberg v. 
Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 58 (3d Cir. 1980).  We easily conclude 
that they do, especially in light of the fact that the plaintiffs 
already had an opportunity to be heard at the original landlord-
tenant proceeding and thus clearly had notice of the money 
judgment against them.  The rules outlined above provide ample 
notice of the levy and execution proceedings, explain the 
judgment debtor's rights and liabilities, set forth the 
procedures for filing objections and provide for prompt hearings 
on those objections.  They protect the interest of the judgment 
creditor by keeping the levy in place during the appeals process, 
thus preventing the judgment debtor from selling or secreting the 
property; and they protect the interests of the judgment debtor 
by providing a forum for a hearing and staying execution of the 
levy until its validity has been determined.  That the appeals 
process may be delayed at the court of common pleas level is 
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attributable to the operations of that court, not the procedural 
rules at the district justice level, and in any event, does not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  Plaintiffs' 
challenge is to the District Justice Rules governing levy and 
execution proceedings.  What happens at the court of common pleas 
is beyond the province of those rules.   
 Plaintiffs argue that the automatic stay provision of Rule 
1020, which prevents all district justice orders affecting 
"execution proceedings" from taking effect once an appeal has 
been filed, infringes the due process rights of judgment debtors 
insofar as it prevents enforcement of orders releasing their 
property from levy during the weeks or months appeal is pending 
before the court of common pleas.  Had the levying constables in 
this case taken actual physical possession of the judgment 
debtors' property, rather than leaving it in the place of levy, 
this argument might have some merit.  Under those circumstances, 
the automatic stay provision of Rule 1020 might infringe upon the 
due process rights of judgment debtors because it would 
completely deprive them of all use and possession of their 
property pending appeal, despite a district justice order in 
their favor.  However, that issue is not before us, and we do not 
decide it here.  We conclude simply that where, as here, (1) the 
levying constable does not take physical possession of the 
property of a judgment debtor but rather leaves it (theoretically 
at least) in the possession of the judgment debtor, (2) a 
district justice issues an order releasing the judgment debtor's 
property from levy, and (3) that order is stayed pursuant to Rule 
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1020 pending appeal, the fact that several weeks or months may 
elapse before the court of common pleas finally determines the 
validity of the order on appeal does not render the automatic 
stay provision of the District Justice Rules violative of due 
process.   
VI. 
 Plaintiff's second argument on appeal is that the levies at 
issue violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful 
seizures insofar as the official levy form lent apparent 
authority to the landlords' unlawful retention of the property of 
their evicted tenants.  Here again, we disagree.  While the 
Fourth Amendment protects property rights outside the criminal 
search and seizure context, Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 113 
S. Ct. 538, 543 (1992), a seizure of property only violates the 
Fourth Amendment if it is unreasonable.  Id. at 549 
("'reasonableness is still the ultimate standard' under the 
Fourth Amendment")(citation omitted).   
 In this case, the constables had authority to levy on 
plaintiffs' property in the form of an order of execution from a 
district justice.  As the Supreme Court noted in Soldal, making a 
showing of unreasonableness when the officer in question was 
acting pursuant to a court order "would be a laborious task 
indeed."  Id.  Moreover, that the levies coincided with 
plaintiffs' evictions does not transform the levies into 
unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. While 
we recognize the hardship that plaintiffs suffered as a result of 
the combination of levy and eviction, we cannot conclude that 
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either the constables or the rules under which they acted violate 
the Constitution.   
VII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court.  
 
 
 
 
18 
 
      
       
CINEA v. CERTO, No. 95-3168 
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
 
 As the court observes, this case does not present a 
substantial constitutional issue.  My reasons for so concluding 
are somewhat different, however, than those assigned in the 
court's opinion. 
 A levy is a seizure under color of state law.  See, 
e.g., 15 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, Execution §§ 61, 62 
(1959).  Such a seizure constitutes deprivation of a property 
interest for due process purposes whether or not the judgment 
debtor may ask the permission of the seizing officer to move the 
property and whether or not the seizing officer may choose to 
allow the judgment debtor to continue to exercise some of the 
attributes of ownership.  See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 
59-60 (3d Cir. 1980).  As the court's opinion demonstrates, 
however, appropriate process in the factual context of this case 
was afforded under the District Justice Rules.  The levy was a 
court authorized seizure based on a duly entered final judgment 
and an opportunity was afforded to secure relief from an 
erroneous or excessive seizure within a maximum of eight days. 
This process exceeds the minimum process due under the 
Constitution as interpreted in Finberg.  
2 
 None of the appellants here is in a position to advance 
the only arguable constitutional issue presented by the District 
Justice Rules.  If Rule 10200 were interpreted as automatically 
precluding a judgment debtor with a meritorious claim for relief 
from an erroneous or excessive seizure from securing that relief 
prior to a final merits decision in the Court of Common Pleas, a 
judgment debtor adversely affected by the application of the Rule 
as so interpreted would be able to raise a substantial 
constitutional issue.0  The stay provided by Rule 1020, however, 
is triggered only by the filing of "a statement of objection" -
i.e., an appeal -- with the Court of Common Pleas.  Thus, this 
substantial issue would be presented for decision only if an 
appellant had been successful on her objection before the 
district justice but the release of her property had been stayed 
                                                           
0
  Rule 1020 provides: 
 
 Until further order of the court of 
common pleas, receipt by the district justice 
of the statement of objection shall operate 
as a stay of any execution proceedings that 
may be affected by the proceedings on the 
statement. 
 
0
  It is not necessary to construe Rule 1020 in this manner. Rule 
1020 provides for "a stay of any execution proceedings that may 
be affected by the" appeal.  At the time the Rule comes into 
play, the levy has been completed and, of what remains to be 
done, the execution sale proceedings would seem to be the most 
likely intended object of the stay.  As so construed, Rule 1020 
would serve only to protect a judgment debtor's property from 
sale when he or she has appealed from a decision of the district 
justice in favor of the creditor.  Given that this is the most 
natural reading and that a contrary one would raise substantial 
issues under the United States Constitution, I believe the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would be more likely to adopt this 
interpretation. 
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under Rule 1020 when the landlord appealed to that court.  No one 
other than Barbara Cinea in this case filed an objection with a 
District Justice.  Cinea filed an objection and secured an order 
releasing some of her property.  The district court's findings of 
fact, however, indicate that the landlord appealed only her 
mother's judgment and the record evidences no appeal from the 
order releasing a portion of her own personal property. Because 
no one involved in this case was adversely affected by Rule 1020, 
the court properly expresses no opinion on its interpretation or 
constitutionality. 
